Game-Theoretic Electric Vehicle Charging Management Resilient to
  Non-Ideal User Behavior by Mediwaththe, Chathurika P. & Smith, David B.
Accepted to appear in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
Game-Theoretic Electric Vehicle Charging
Management Resilient to Non-Ideal User Behavior
Chathurika P. Mediwaththe, Student Member, IEEE, David B. Smith, Member, IEEE,
Abstract—In this paper, an electric vehicle (EV) charging
competition, among EV aggregators that perform coordinated
EV charging, is explored while taking into consideration po-
tential non-ideal actions of the aggregators. In the coordinated
EV charging strategy presented in this paper, each aggregator
determines EV charging start time and charging energy profiles
to minimize overall EV charging energy cost by including
consideration of the actions of the neighboring aggregators.
The competitive interactions of the aggregators are modeled
by developing a two-stage non-cooperative game among the
aggregators. The game is then studied under prospect theory
to examine the impacts of non-ideal actions of the aggregators
in selecting EV charging start times according to subjectively
evaluating their opponents’ actions. It is shown that the non-
cooperative interactions among the aggregators lead to a subgame
perfect -Nash equilibrium when the game is played with either
ideal, or non-ideal, actions of the aggregators. A case study
presented demonstrates that the benefits of the coordinated EV
charging strategy, in terms of energy cost savings and peak-to-
average ratio reductions, are significantly resilient to non-ideal
actions of the aggregators.
Index Terms—Aggregator, electric vehicle (EV), expected util-
ity theory, game theory, grid-to-vehicle, non-ideal user behavior,
prospect theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Escalating fuel prices and environmental concerns have
increased the market penetration of electric vehicles (EVs)
worldwide. For example, a recent study [1] has shown that
the annual growth rate of EV sales in the United States is
more than 20%. Despite environment-friendly features, unco-
ordinated EV charging creates challenges to both economical
and technical aspects of the power grid as a consequence of
excessive load consumption. Due to the escalation in electricity
demand provoked by EVs, demand-side management has
become a paramount element in power system operation as
it can decrease EV charging costs by coordinating the grid-
to-vehicle operation economically. EV aggregators have been
widely adopted in the present energy market with the aim of
facilitating coordinated charging of EVs at large scale. An EV
aggregator acts as a middleman, between a fleet of EVs and
the power grid, to optimally regulate the charging plan of the
vehicle fleet so as to minimize overall cost of EV charging
considering EV charging constraints [2], [3].
Effective demand-side management of grid-to-vehicle op-
eration requires active participation of users who are either
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vehicle owners or EV aggregators that seek to optimize
individual goals through coordinated EV charging. However,
in the long run, users might deviate from their ideal partic-
ipating behavior despite the benefits that they gain through
participating in demand-side management. Unpredictable non-
ideal behavior of users is likely to compromise the economic
benefits and system efficiencies of demand-side management.
A successful energy management approach for EV charging
is often challenging with inconsistent user behavior [4].
In this paper, the EV charging competition among multiple
EV aggregators in a coordinated EV charging system is studied
while accounting for actions of the aggregators that are not
completely rational. Each aggregator, which could be run by,
e.g., a car park manager, determines EV charging start time
and charging energy profiles to minimize EV charging energy
cost by considering the actions of the neighboring EV aggrega-
tors. The interactions among the EV aggregators are modeled
using a non-cooperative game-theoretic framework, which is
then studied under two user behavioral models, expected utility
theory and prospect theory, to incorporate aggregators’ ideal
and non-ideal actions in selecting EV charging start times in
the EV charging competition. The main contributions of this
paper can be stated as follows:
• We model the coordinated EV charging competition
among the EV aggregators as a two-stage non-cooperative
game and show that there exists a subgame perfect -Nash
equilibrium when the game is played with either ideal,
or non-ideal, actions of the aggregators.
• We analyze the impacts of non-ideal actions of the EV
aggregators through an extensive performance analysis
and show that the benefits of the coordinated EV charging
strategy, in terms of peak-to-average ratio reductions
and EV charging cost savings, are resilient to non-ideal
actions taken by the aggregators.
Prospect theory has emerged as a prominent tool to examine
non-ideal user behavior that departs from the rational choices
in game theory. To the best of our knowledge, few works
related to demand-side management have applied prospect
theory to study non-ideal, realistic behavior of participants
that cannot be explained by assuming consumer rationality
[5], [6]. For example, [5] elaborates insights from prospect
theory to study realistic consumer decision-making in a load-
shifting demand response program for residential households.
In [6], prospect theory is used to study the user behavior in
a Stackelberg game-theoretic energy trading system between
a community energy storage device and photovoltaic energy
users. Due to the inherent differences in system models
and associated constraints between the EV charging scenario
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and the residential load-shifting and bi-level energy trading
systems, the prospect theory-based analyses in [5], [6] cannot
be directly applied to the EV charging scenario considered
in this paper. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, in
literature, the effects of non-ideal actions of participating users
on an EV charging scenario have not been investigated using
prospect theory.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II presents related work. Section III describes the EV
charging system configuration, and Section IV describes the
two-stage non-cooperative game among the EV aggregators.
Section V elaborates the non-cooperative EV charging energy
determination game among the aggregators and Section VI
discusses the participation time selection game of the aggre-
gators. Section VII presents numerical results and Section VIII
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Strategic decision-making of users has been widely in-
vestigated, by modeling user behavior, in many user-centric
applications in sociology, economics, and energy markets [7]–
[9]. Game theory has been a popular analytical platform
in demand-side management literature to model how users
strategically reason about their neighbors’ behavior to de-
termine their own energy strategies such that the system-
wide objectives are optimized [10]–[14]. The demand-side
management approach in [15] optimally schedules the user
energy consumption through a non-cooperative game among
energy users. The non-cooperative Stackelberg game in [16]
explores optimal load interaction between a utility company
and residential energy users to balance energy demand and
supply. Moreover, the insights of game theory have been
used to study the energy trading competition between shared
energy storage systems and self-interested solar energy users
for small-scale demand-side management [17], [18].
Game theory is also used in the context of distributed
optimal operation in EV charging systems [19]–[22]. Based on
game theory, [20] explores optimal price competition among
EV charging stations with renewable energy generation to
attract EVs. Using a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach,
[21] investigates an optimal demand response method for
effective scheduling of plug-in hybrid EV charging. By investi-
gating a non-cooperative game among self-interested EV own-
ers, an optimal valley filling pricing mechanism to coordinate
EV charging is proposed in [3]. Using a non-cooperative game
among EVs at a parking lot, [23] studies an effective way of
obtaining EV charging strategies at a unique Nash equilibrium
under the constrained distribution transformer capacity. The
non-cooperative Stackelberg game-theoretic approach in [24]
investigates the optimal bi-level grid-to-vehicle coordination
between the power grid and plug-in EV groups with lim-
ited energy supply. Most of the game-theoretic demand-side
management literature optimizes important aspects of various
energy markets conforming to conventional game theory that
fundamentally assumes rational choices by users.
Empirical evidence from social studies has illustrated that
the axiom of rationality of game theory can be violated when
users face risk and uncertainty in decision-making [25]. In
[26], discrepancies between rational choice and alternative
user behavioral models in an energy market are reviewed.
Prospect theory has attracted great attention in various re-
search communities to understand impacts of deviations from
rationality [5], [27], [28]. A comprehensive discussion on
the potential of prospect theory to understand how decision-
making under risk and uncertainty can affect various smart
grid applications is given in [29]. In [30], optimal energy
exchange among geographically-distributed consumer-owned
energy storage devices is compared under classical game
theory and prospect theory. In [31], the effects of subjective
consumer behavior on an energy storage charging-discharging
system are investigated using a utility framing method derived
from prospect theory. In contrast to previous work, this paper
presents precepts of prospect theory to realize potential non-
ideal behavior of EV aggregators in a non-cooperative game-
theoretic EV charging system.
III. SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
This section describes the formulation of the system models
of EV aggregators and the cost models that are used to derive
energy costs in this paper.
A. Electric Vehicle Charging Model
In this paper, a low-voltage power grid with multiple EV
aggregators distributed along the grid is considered. Here, an
EV aggregator acts as an intermediary between the power grid
and a fleet of EVs and regulates and schedules charging of
the connected EVs considering EV charging constraints. In
this work, only grid-to-vehicle operation with unidirectional
power flow is considered.
In the system model, the set of EV aggregators is denoted
as N and |N | = N . Each aggregator i ∈ N controls an EV
charging station that consists of multiple EV chargers within
a localized geographical area. For example, such charging
stations may be located in car parks at workplaces, universities,
and shopping centers. Each aggregator i regulates charging
of a set of EVs Vi over a set period of time T of the day
and |Vi| = Vi. In this paper, the EV charging time frame T
is assumed to span from 8.00 AM to 4.00 PM considering
a workplace charging scenario. In this case, it is considered
that EVs in Vi arrive at the charging station by 8.00 AM
and park at the charging station for the entire time period of
T , committing to an agreement between EV owners and the
aggregator i. The charging horizon T is divided into T number
of time slots of ∆t length and the control time is denoted
by t ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T}. In this situation, the aggregators, which
may be run by car park managers, can coordinate EV charging
efficiently to charge EVs within the considered time period
T . At the end of time period T , it is required to charge all
EVs in Vi to their maximum state-of-charge (SOC) limits.
Furthermore, this work assumes that additional EVs will not
join the set Vi during the time period T similar to the EV
charging framework considered in [32].
Without loss of generality, it is considered that there is a
base load profile Lb on the grid that is not time-flexible and
Lb is given by
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Lb = (Lb,1, · · · , Lb,t, · · · , Lb,T ) (1)
where Lb,t(> 0) is the base grid load at time t. For example,
Lb may constitute non-deferrable loads of users of the grid.
From the utility’s perspective, Lb,t represents the minimum
load that the utility should provide at time t.
For each aggregator i, there is an energy demand Ei that
is equal to the total energy demands of the EVs in Vi. The
energy demand of an EV v ∈ Vi is given by
ev = Sv,init − Sv,max (2)
where Sv,init and Sv,max are the SOC level at the beginning
of T and maximum SOC level of the battery of EV v,
respectively. Using (2), Ei can be written as Ei =
∑Vi
v=1 ev .
In the EV charging model, each aggregator i supplies energy
Ei to the EVs in Vi by distributing it across time T . In
this situation, the temporal grid energy consumption profile
of aggregator i over the time period T is given by
xi = (xi,1, · · · , xi,t, · · · , xi,T ) (3)
where xi,t is the energy amount taken from the grid by
aggregator i at time t.
To consider conversion losses of EV chargers controlled by
aggregator i, a charging efficiency parameter ηi is introduced
such that 0 < ηi ≤ 1. For example, if xi,t amount of energy
is taken from the grid by aggregator i, only ηixi,t amount is
effectively dispatched for charging EVs in Vi. Given (3) and
ηi, Ei of each aggregator i satisfies
Ei =
T∑
t=1
ηixi,t. (4)
It is considered that each EV v ∈ Vi is charged using a
charging rate between a maximum charging rate Rv and a
minimum charging rate taken as zero at time t [32], [33].
This gives
0 ≤ rv,t ≤ Rv (5)
where rv,t is the charging rate of EV v ∈ Vi at time t.
Considering (5) for all EVs in Vi, energy consumption xi,t
satisfies
0 ≤ ηixi,t
∆t
≤
Vi∑
v=1
Rv. (6)
In this paper, it is assumed that the total power demand of
aggregators at each time t can be obtained from the grid
without violating the grid voltage and capacity constraints.
B. Energy Cost Models
In this paper, a dynamic grid cost function that consists of
both real time and time-of-use pricing elements is considered
[15]. Given the total grid load as Lt = Lb,t +
∑N
i=1 xi,t, the
grid cost function at time t is given as
Pt(Lt) = φtL
2
t + δtLt (7)
where φt and δt are positive time-of-use tariff constants at time
t. The cost function (7) can be regarded as a quadratic function
that approximates piecewise linear pricing models adopted by
some electric utility companies [15], [34]. By incorporating
time-of-use and real time pricing components with these cost
models, users can be encouraged to shift their peak demand
to non-peak hours [15], [16], [35]. According to (7), per unit
electricity price of the grid at time t, pt, is given as pt =
φtLt + δt, and the resulting grid energy cost of aggregator i
at time t is given by ptxi,t.
In addition to the grid energy cost, another cost component
Di,t is defined for each aggregator i to model their utility
based on the deviation between the actual energy consumption
and the target energy consumption at time t [36]. Denoting the
target energy consumption of aggregator i at time t as x¯i,t,
Di,t is given by
Di,t =
{
gi,t(x¯i,t − xi,t)2, if 0 ≤ xi,t < x¯i,t,
0, if xi,t ≥ x¯i,t
(8)
where gi,t(> 0) is a weighting parameter related to aggre-
gator i that measures how the cost component (x¯i,t − xi,t)2
affects total aggregator cost function. In this paper, the target
energy demands x¯i,t of each aggregator i are evaluated such
that x¯i,t at time t is equal to the average of the total
demand that needs to be supplied within the time frame
[t, t + 1, · · · , T ]. In particular, x¯i,t is evaluated such that
x¯i,t = (Ei −
∑(t−1)
t=ti
xi,t)/((T − t) + 1); ti ≤ t ≤ T . The
cost term (8) motivates charging of EVs connected to each
aggregator i above the average demand at each time t. In doing
so, it encourages drawing more energy at the beginning of time
frame ti ≤ t ≤ T so that charge levels of EV batteries can
be maintained at reasonable values even if the EVs depart the
system prior to the expected departure time.
In this framework, if aggregator i charges EV v ∈ Vi using
maximum charging rate Rv , then they require ev/Rv number
of time slots to reach Sv,max from Sv,init. It is assumed that if
aggregator i starts EV charging at time slot ti ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T},
then they continue the charging process for ti ≤ t ≤ T . For
instance, if aggregator i starts charging the EVs in Vi at time
slot 3, then the aggregator determines (xi,3, xi,4, · · · , xi,T )
such that Ei =
∑T
t=3 ηixi,t. Given this assumption and if
aggregator i charges each EV v ∈ Vi using their maximum
charging rate Rv , then the aggregator requires τi time slots to
finish charging all EVs in Vi where
τi = max(e1/R1, e2/R2, · · · , eVi/RVi). (9)
Since aggregator i can vary the charging rates of each EV
in Vi according to (5), τi represents the minimum number of
time slots that aggregator i requires to charge all EVs in Vi.
This implies that for a given τi, aggregator should start EV
charging at least from time slot t˜i where t˜i = (T − τi) + 1.
Hence, aggregator i can start EV charging between time slots
1 and t˜i. Then, the set of all possible EV charging start times
Ii of aggregator i can be written as Ii = {1, 2, · · · , t˜i} where
Ii ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , T}. If aggregator i starts the EV charging
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process at time slot ti ∈ Ii, then their total energy cost is
given by
Ci =
T∑
t=ti
(ptxi,t +Di,t). (10)
IV. TWO-STAGE NON-COOPERATIVE GAME
To analyze how each aggregator i determines their EV
charging start time ti and EV charging energy amounts xi,t
at each time t, a two-stage non-cooperative game Υ among
the aggregators N is developed. At the first stage of the game
Υ, the aggregators N non-cooperatively determine their EV
charging start time ti ∈ Ii with imperfect information [37].
After observing how the aggregators have selected ti ∈ Ii at
the first stage, each aggregator i non-cooperatively determines
xi,t with imperfect information at the second stage.
Since each aggregator i has |Ii| number of possible actions
in total at the first stage of the game Υ, the extensive form of
the game Υ implies that at the second stage, the game Υ has
K = (|I1|×|I2|×· · ·×|IN |) number of proper subgames [38].
It is considered that the set of proper subgames at the second
stage are as G = {G1, G2, · · · , GK}. Then the game Υ has
(K+1) number of subgames including the entire game itself.
In this paper, the strategic form of the game Υ is described
as follows.
• Players: The set of aggregators N .
• Strategies: Each aggregator i selects (ti,xi) to maxi-
mize their payoff. In particular, at the first stage, each
aggregator i determines ti ∈ Ii. Then at the second
stage, depending on the selected ti at the first stage, each
aggregator i determines xi = (xi,ti , xi,ti+1, · · · , xi,T )
such that xi ∈ Xi where Xi subject to constraints (4)
and (6).
• Payoffs: For an action profile (ti,xi), aggregator i re-
ceives a payoff
Ui = −Ci = −
T∑
t=ti
(ptxi,t +Di,t). (11)
To determine the solutions of the game Υ, first, the optimal
solutions for each subgame in G at the second stage are
evaluated. Then the analysis proceeds backwards to the first
stage where each aggregator i determines optimal ti ∈ Ii
that maximizes their payoffs, which result if the optimal
actions determined for each subgame in G are adopted by the
aggregators N at the second stage. The explicit analyses of
these two steps are given in the next two sections.
V. SECOND STAGE GAME: CHARGING ENERGY
DETERMINATION GAME
This section explains the process of determining EV charg-
ing energy amounts by each aggregator i once they have
selected to start EV charging from time slot ti ∈ Ii. Let
Gσ ∈ G be the subgame among the aggregators N at the
second stage if they adopt an EV charging start time profile
σ = (t1, t2, · · · , tN ) ∈ I at the first stage of the game Υ.
Here, I denotes the cartesian product of strategy sets Ii of the
aggregators N that is given by I = {I1×I2×· · ·×IN}. Be-
cause each aggregator i continues EV charging for ti ≤ t ≤ T
once they have selected to start EV charging at time ti, in the
game Gσ , each aggregator i seeks to maximize their individual
payoff given in (11). In this scenario, their individual decisions
on xi,t are influenced by each others’ energy consumption
decisions due to the aggregate load dependency of the grid
price pt. The strategic form of the game Gσ is given as follows.
• Players: The set of aggregators N .
• Strategies: Each aggregator i determines xi ∈ Xi to
maximize payoff.
• Payoffs: Each aggregator i receives a payoff given by
(11).
In the game Gσ , each aggregator i solves the local opti-
mization problem to determine
x˜i = argmax
xi∈Xi
Ui(xi,x−i) (12)
where Ui(xi,x−i) ≡ Ui and x−i is the EV charging energy
profile of the other aggregators i′ ∈ N\i.
Proposition 1. The game Gσ has a unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. For a given x−i, the objective function in (12) is
strictly concave with respect to xi as its Hessian matrix with
respect to xi is negative definite. Moreover, the strategy set Xi
of each aggregator i is non-empty, compact, and convex due to
linearity of (4) and (6). Therefore, the game Gσ is a concave
N-person game and has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium [39].
Moreover, that Nash equilibrium is unique as the objective
function and the strategy sets in (12) satisfy Theorem 2 in
[39].
The Nash equilibrium of the game Gσ is denoted by x∗ =
(x∗1,x
∗
2, · · · ,x∗N ). In this paper, x∗ is approximated using
the iterative best-response algorithm given in Algorithm 1.
The algorithm terminates when the relative distance of x
between two consecutive iterations is very small, for example,
‖x(k) − x(k−1)‖2/‖x(k)‖2 ≤ ε where ε is a very small
positive value and k is the iteration number.
Remark 1. If the charging model allowed random arrivals
and departures of EVs during the charging time frame T ,
the game Gσ among the aggregators would turn into a game
with incomplete information where uncertainty occurs over the
strategy spaces Xi available to each aggregator i.
VI. FIRST STAGE GAME: PARTICIPATION TIME
SELECTION GAME
In this section, the selection of optimal EV charging start
times of the aggregators N at the first stage of the game Υ is
described. Note that, since the solution analysis of the game Υ
moves backwards, the game at the first stage has a payoff for
its each action profile σ ∈ I equals to the Nash equilibrium
payoff obtained for its corresponding subgame Gσ ∈ G at the
second stage. Let Φ denote the non-cooperative game among
the aggregators N at the first stage that has payoffs equivalent
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Algorithm 1 Game to obtain the Nash Equilibrium of the
game Gσ
1: Using EV charging start time ti, randomly initialize xi
for each aggregator i such that xi ∈ Xi and set k ← 0.
2: while termination criterion is not satisfied do
3: Set k ← k + 1.
4: for each aggregator i do
5: Aggregator i solves (12) and determines x˜i using
the temporal aggregate grid load vector, excluding i’s
load, L(k−1)−i =
(
L
(k−1)
ti,−i , · · · , L
(k−1)
t,−i , · · · , L(k−1)T,−i
)
at the previous iteration k − 1. Here, L(k−1)t,−i =
L
(k−1)
t − x(k−1)i,t .
6: end for
7: end while
8: return The Nash equilibrium x∗.
to the Nash equilibrium payoffs of subgames G at the second
stage. Explicitly, the game Φ can be described as follows.
• Players: The set of aggregators N .
• Strategies: Each aggregator i determines ti ∈ Ii to
maximize payoff.
• Payoffs: If the aggregators’ EV charging start time profile
is σ ∈ I, then each aggregator i receives a payoff given
by
Fi(σ) = −
T∑
t=ti
p∗t (σ)x
∗
i,t(σ) +D
∗
i,t(σ) (13)
where p∗t (σ) and x
∗
i,t(σ) are the unit grid price and
the EV charging energy amount of aggregator i at time
t obtained at the Nash equilibrium of the game Gσ ,
respectively. Furthermore, D∗i,t(σ) is the cost given in
(8) after obtaining the Nash equilibrium of the game Gσ .
Let σ−i denote the EV charging start time strategy profile
of all aggregators N excluding aggregator i. Then in the game
Φ, each aggregator i maximizes the payoff given in (13) by
determining the optimal ti ∈ Ii for a given σ−i.
Proposition 2. A Nash equilibrium strategy profile of the game
Φ leads to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game
Υ.
Proof. The proof of the proposition immediately follows
intuitions of backward induction [38]. In particular, when
considering the extensive form (tree form) of the two-stage
game Υ, the game Φ is the reduced game of the game Υ after
eliminating all subgames G at the second stage by assigning
their Nash equilibrium outcomes to the outcomes after the
first stage of the game Υ. For example, with respect to the
strategy profile σ ∈ I, the payoff of each aggregator i in
(13) is defined by assuming that the aggregators N will play
the Nash equilibrium of the corresponding subgame Gσ at
the second stage. Therefore, a Nash equilibrium of the game
Φ leads to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game
Υ.
Remark 2. Once the aggregators N have determined their
optimal EV charging start time profile σ∗ by playing the game
Φ, they play the non-cooperative game Gσ∗ ∈ G where Gσ∗
is the subgame at the second stage of the game Υ subsequent
to σ∗.
In the long run, the aggregators N may change their
behavior with respect to selecting EV charging start times ti.
Therefore, to determine solutions for the game Φ, aggregators’
empirical frequencies of choosing start times ti ∈ Ii are con-
sidered under the notion of mixed strategies. In this scenario,
the aggregators N face uncertainty in decision-making with
their probabilistic choices of EV charging start times. Hence,
in this paper, the strategic behavior of the aggregators N is
studied under two user behavioral models: expected utility
theory, i.e., the conventional game-theoretic approach, and
prospect theory that learns the subjective non-ideal behavior
of users [25].
A. Time Selection under Expected Utility Theory
To analyze the game Φ under mixed strategies, it is
considered that each aggregator i evaluates the probability
distribution over their strategy set Ii to maximize expected
payoff. In classical game theory, expected utility theory is
the main platform that is used to describe user behavior and
payoffs under the notion of mixed strategy. In this paper, the
expected payoff of each aggregator i under expected utility
theory is given by
QEUTi,Φ (a) =
∑
σ∈I
Fi(σ)
∏
j∈N
aj(tj) (14)
where a = (ai,a−i), ai = (ai(1), ai(2), · · · , ai(t˜i)), ai(ti)
is the probability that aggregator i selects time slot ti as the
EV charging start time, and a−i is the probabilities of the
other aggregators i′ ∈ N\i of choosing their EV charging
start times.
Intuitively speaking, the payoff calculation under expected
utility theory implies that players assess probabilities of their
opponents’ actions identical to their objective likelihoods.
However, empirical evidence from sociology infers that this
assumption may not be valid in many real world applications
as often users, such as car park managers in our case study,
underweight high probability events and overweight low prob-
ability events when they face risk and uncertainty [25].
B. Time Selection under Prospect Theory
The intuition behind prospect theory is to describe user
behavior that cannot be understood by assuming rational
choices of users as in normative expected utility theory [25]. In
the real world, it has been shown that people exhibit subjective
behavior rather than objective behavior in payoff maximization
problems. This section investigates how the aggregators N
maximize their utilities in the game Φ while subjectively
evaluating their neighbors’ behavior.
Prospect theory uses weighting effects to characterize the
subjective behavior of users [25] and in particular, probability
weighting functions are widely investigated [40], [41]. In
general, a probability weighting function wi(a) indicates the
subjective evaluation of aggregator i on an action played with
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probability a. In this paper, Prelec’s probability weighting
function [41] is used that is given by
wi(a) = exp(−(−ln a)αi) (15)
where αi is a weighting parameter of aggregator i and 0 <
αi ≤ 1. It is important to note that aggregator i becomes
more subjective and deviates more from objective evaluation
over probabilities as αi moves from 1 towards 0. On the other
hand, αi = 1 implies that aggregator i perceives the action
with probability a objectively, and therefore, their subjective
evaluation and objective evaluation are identical.
Here, it is assumed that the subjective probabilities of
aggregator i of their own actions are equal to the objective
probabilities. Then the expected payoff of each aggregator i
under prospect theory is given by
QPTi,Φ(a) =
∑
σ∈I
Fi(σ)ai(ti)
( ∏
i′∈N\i
wi(ai′(ti′))
)
. (16)
C. -Nash equilibria
In this section, the solutions for the game Φ under expected
utility theory and prospect theory are studied. In particular,
-Nash equilibria for the game Φ are investigated under two
models due to their attractive properties such as computational
usefulness and the guarantee that every Nash equilibrium is
surrounded by -Nash equilibria for small  > 0 [37]. A mixed
strategy profile aˆ = (aˆi, aˆ−i) is an -Nash equilibrium for the
game Φ if it satisfies
Qi,Φ(aˆi, aˆ−i) ≥ Qi,Φ(a′i, aˆ−i)− , ∀a′i ∈ Ai\aˆi, ∀i ∈ N
(17)
where aˆ−i is the equilibrium mixed strategy profile of the
other aggregators i′ ∈ N\i, Ai is the set of all possible mixed
strategy profiles of aggregator i over Ii, and  > 0. Note that,
in (17), Qi,Φ generalizes QEUTi,Φ under expected utility theory
and QPTi,Φ under prospect theory.
Remark 3. Proposition 2 implies that finding a mixed strategy
-Nash equilibrium of the game Φ under expected utility theory
or prospect theory leads to a mixed strategy subgame perfect
-Nash equilibrium [42] of the game Υ.
For the game Φ, under each user behavioral model, an -
Nash equilibrium that is closely located to a mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium is explored. To this end, the iterative algo-
rithm proposed in [5] is used where the algorithm was proven
to converge to an -Nash equilibrium close to a mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium of a finite non-cooperative game under both
expected utility theory and prospect theory. In a nutshell, the
algorithm is given by
a
(k+1)
i = a
(k)
i +
β
k + 1
(z
(k)
i − a(k)i ), 0 < β < 1 (18)
where β is the inertia weight. Moreover, z(k)i =(
z
(k)
i (ti,1), · · · , z(k)i (ti,t˜i)
)
where
z
(k)
i (ti,t) =
1, if ti,t = argmaxti∈Ii qi(ti,a
(k−1)
−i ),
0, otherwise.
(19)
Here, qi(ti,a
(k−1)
−i ) is the expected payoff of aggregator i
when they select the pure strategy ti for a given mixed strategy
profile a(k−1)−i of their opponents i
′ ∈ N\i at the iteration
k − 1. For prospect theory, a(k−1)−i considers the weighted
probabilities of the aggregators i′ ∈ N\i at the iteration k−1.
When the above algorithm converges, the -Nash equilibrium
with regard to a is found under expected utility theory and
prospect theory.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Simulation Setup
To numerically examine the impacts of the EV charging
competition among the EV aggregators with their ideal and
non-ideal behavior, a system with five EV aggregators (N =
5) was considered. The EV charging scheduling time frame
T spans from 8.00 AM to 4.00 PM and T = 16 with ∆t =
30 min.
It was assumed that the EV fleet at each aggregator i has
10 EVs, and EV chargers at each aggregator i uses Level 2
charging. Level 2 charging is the primary approach used for
EV charging at public places and typically uses EV charging
rates between 3 kW and 20 kW [43]. For simulations in this
paper, three types of EVs were considered, namely, Toyota
Prius (3.8 kW, 4.4 kWh), Chevrolet Volt (3.8 kW, 16 kWh),
and Nissan Leaf (3.3 kW, 24 kWh) [43]. The distributions of
different types of EVs at each aggregator i are given in Table I.
Initial percentage SOC levels of the EVs controlled by each
aggregator i were randomly chosen between 0% and 100% of
EVs’ maximum energy storage capacities. It was assumed that
all EVs should be charged to 100% of their maximum energy
storage capacities by the time T . The charging efficiency ηi
of EV chargers controlled by each aggregator i was assumed
to be 0.864 that is equivalent to the average Level 2 charging
efficiency given in [44]. Target energy demand profiles of each
aggregator i were generated as explained in Section III-B.
For each aggregator i, gi,t was randomly chosen from the set
{10, 11, · · · , 20}. Under these circumstances, Table II presents
the possible EV charging start time strategy profiles Ii for the
considered set of aggregators.
In simulations, Lb was assumed to be the aggregate energy
demand of 200 residential facilities where the average energy
TABLE I
NUMBER OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF EVS AVAILABLE AT EACH
AGGREGATOR i ∈ N
i Toyota Prius Chevrolet Volt Nissan Leaf
1 2 3 5
2 2 5 3
3 3 2 5
4 3 5 2
5 5 3 2
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TABLE II
EV CHARGING START TIME STRATEGY PROFILES Ii, ∀i ∈ N
i
EV Charging Start Time
Strategy Profiles Ii
1 {1, 2, · · · , 5}
2 {1, 2, · · · , 7}
3 {1, 2, · · · , 10}
4 {1, 2, · · · , 8}
5 {1, 2, · · · , 11}
demand profile between 8.00 AM and 4.00 PM is equivalent
to the average energy demand profile of the Western Power
Network in Australia between 8.00 AM and 4.00 PM in a
Spring day [45]. For grid pricing, φt = 0.2 AU cents/kWh2
and δt = 0.2 AU cents/kWh at each time t ∈ T so that
the peak unit energy price of the grid when all EVs at each
aggregator i are charged using their maximum charging power
rates is equivalent to the peak usage domestic time-of-use tariff
in [46].
For the algorithm in (18), initial probability distributions
a
(0)
i were selected such that
∑
Ii ai(ti) = 1 for each aggre-
gator i, and β = 0.7. To compare results, an uncoordinated EV
charging scenario was considered where all aggregators begin
to charge their EV fleets from the time slot 1 using EVs’
maximum charging power rates. The uncoordinated charging
scenario uses the same energy cost models for the aggregators
N in Section III.
B. Results and Discussion
Fig. 1 shows the expected cost savings of each aggregator
in N compared to the uncoordinated charging scenario under
expected utility theory and prospect theory for two different
α ∈ (0, 1] values (α = 0.1 and α = 0.7). Here, it is
assumed that αi = α, ∀i ∈ N where the probability weighting
parameter α is applied according to (15). It is important to
note that when α = 0.1 aggregators become more subjective
and non-ideal than when α = 0.7 because as α tends to 0
from 1, aggregators deviate further from the objective behavior
assumed in expected utility theory. Table III presents the mixed
strategy -Nash equilibria obtained for the game Φ under
expected utility theory and prospect theory.
According to the table, when aggregators have more sub-
jective behavior with α = 0.1, the equilibrium probability
distributions over Ii of each aggregator i deviate from that
of expected utility theory. In particular, when α = 0.1, the
fourth and fifth aggregators prefer to participate from the
time slot 1, whereas they prefer to participate from the time
slot 3 under expected utility theory. When aggregators behave
closer to the objective behavior by adopting α = 0.7, the
fifth aggregator is more likely to start EV charging in the
time slot 3 and the fourth aggregator prefers the time slot 1.
Despite the changes in probabilistic choices of choosing an
EV charging start time, Fig. 1 depicts that for each α value in
prospect-theoretic analysis, the expected cost savings for the
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Fig. 1. Expected cost savings for the aggregators N under expected utility
theory and prospect theory when α = 0.1 and α = 0.7.
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Fig. 2. Expected EV charging loads on the grid in the time slot 1 of the
aggregators N under expected utility theory and prospect theory when α =
0.1 and α = 0.7.
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Fig. 3. Temporal variation of expected aggregate grid load under expected
utility theory and prospect theory when α = 0.1.
aggregators N remain almost same as the savings obtained
under expected utility theory (α = 1).
Fig. 2 illustrates the aggregators’ expected EV charging grid
loads in the time slot 1 under prospect theory with α = 0.1
and α = 0.7 compared to that of expected utility theory.
Fig. 3 shows the temporal variation of the expected aggregate
grid load after studying the EV charging competition under
expected utility theory and prospect theory when α = 0.1.
Fig. 2 shows that when α = 0.1, the fifth aggregator incurs
a significant EV charging load on the grid in the time slot 1
compared to their expected EV charging grid loads in expected
utility theory and in prospect theory with α = 0.7. Similarly,
when α = 0.1, the fourth aggregator also has a significant
Accepted to appear in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
TABLE III
PERCENTAGE PARTICIPATION PROBABILITIES OF THE AGGREGATORS i ∈ N FOR ti ∈ Ii UNDER EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY (EUT) AND PROSPECT
THEORY (PT) WHEN α = 0.7, 0.1
EUT probabilities
i.e., when α = 1 (%)
PT probabilities
when α = 0.7 (%)
PT probabilities
when α = 0.1 (%)
ti i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5
1 99.75 99.75 99.04 4.48 1.59 99.81 99.81 99.81 99.81 6.31 99.12 99.12 99.12 99.12 99.12
2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.1 0.1 0.08 0.1 0.1
3 0.03 0.03 0.73 95.31 98.18 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 93.52 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.05
4 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.1 0.08 0.1 0.1 0.03
5 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.58 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
6 - 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 - 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 - 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
7 - 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 - 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 - 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
8 - - 0.03 0.08 0.03 - - 0.02 0.07 0.02 - - 0.1 0.28 0.1
9 - - 0.03 - 0.03 - - 0.02 - 0.02 - - 0.1 - 0.1
10 - - 0.03 - 0.03 - - 0.02 - 0.02 - - 0.1 - 0.1
11 - - - - 0.03 - - - - 0.02 - - - - 0.1
charging load in the time slot 1 compared to expected utility
theory. Similar trends were observed for the time slot 2 as well.
This is because both aggregators prefer to participate from the
time slot 1 when α = 0.1, whereas, in expected utility theory,
they prefer to participate from the time slot 3 (see Table III).
As shown in Fig. 3, the increase in EV charging loads of the
fourth and fifth aggregators when α = 0.1 results in nearly
9% higher load on the grid in each time slot (time slot 1 and
2) than expected utility theory.
Next, the influences of EV charging competition among
the EV aggregators were studied across a range of possible
α values. Here, α was varied in the range (0, 1]. Fig. 4
illustrates the average expected cost savings of the aggregators
N compared to the uncoordinated charging scenario with
respect to changes in α. Fig. 5 depicts the variations of
expected peak-to-average ratio reductions compared to the
uncoordinated charging scenario with varying α. From the
grid’s perspective, a higher peak-to-average ratio reduction
is preferred because it implies better peak load regulation
compared to the uncoordinated EV charging case. According
to Fig. 4, when 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.6, the average expected cost
savings of the aggregators N are slightly lower than that
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Fig. 4. Average of expected cost savings of the aggregators N with different
α.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
30
40
50
60
α
Ex
pe
cte
d P
AR
 R
ed
uc
tio
n (
%)
 
 
EUT
PT
Fig. 5. Expected peak-to-average ratio (PAR) reduction with different α.
obtained under expected utility theory. In particular, compared
to the average expected cost saving under expected utility
theory, this reduction is insignificant with only 0.01%. When
0.65 ≤ α ≤ 0.75, each aggregator in N receives a higher
average expected cost saving with nearly 0.1% increase. On
the other hand, Fig. 5 shows that the expected peak-to-average
ratio reductions remain nearly unchanged across the range of
α. When 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.6, the peak-to-average ratio reductions
are slightly lower than those achieved under expected utility
theory. This is because, in this range of α, the EV charging
competition among the aggregators leads to higher peak loads
on the grid than the peak grid load under expected utility
theory, for example, as shown in Fig. 3.
Finally, the impacts of the EV charging competition when
each aggregator i has different α values, i.e., αi = αj for
{i.j} ∈ N , i 6= j, were investigated. To this end, it was
considered α = (0.7, 0.5, 0.9, 0.1, 0.3) as the matrix of αi
of the aggregators N under prospect theory. All other param-
eters are as specified for the previous simulation. Fig. 6 shows
the expected cost savings for each aggregator in N compared
to the uncoordinated EV charging scenario under expected
utility theory and prospect theory. Similar to the case where
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Fig. 6. Comparison of the expected cost savings of the aggrega-
tors N under expected utility theory and prospect theory when α =
(0.7, 0.5, 0.9, 0.1, 0, 3).
αi = α, ∀i ∈ N , here the prospect-theoretic energy cost
savings remain nearly the same as expected cost savings under
expected utility theory. On the other hand, the expected peak-
to-average ratio reduction of 50.16% under expected utility
theory increases slightly to 50.30% reduction in the prospect-
theoretic scenario with α = (0.7, 0.5, 0.9, 0.1, 0.3).
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated impacts of non-ideal, subjective
participating behavior of multiple electric vehicle (EV) aggre-
gators, which might be run by car park managers, interacting
in a coordinated EV charging competition. In the presented EV
charging strategy, each aggregator minimizes their individual
EV charging costs by selecting optimal EV charging start times
and energy profiles. The EV charging competition among
the aggregators was modeled by developing a two-stage non-
cooperative game among the aggregators, which was studied
under prospect theory to incorporate non-ideal participating
actions of the aggregators. The non-cooperative EV charging
game can obtain a subgame perfect -Nash equilibrium when
the game is played with either ideal, or non-ideal, participating
actions of the aggregators. Through numerical simulations, we
have shown that the benefits of the coordinated EV charging
strategy, in terms of EV charging energy cost reductions and
peak load regulation, are significantly resilient to non-ideal
participating actions taken by the aggregators.
Future work could focus on extending the analysis in
this work to investigate the charging system by including
uncertainties that arise with stochastic behavior of EVs using
insights from Bayesian game theory [37]. Further study could
incorporate both grid-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-grid operations
with demand-side management so that EV storage devices can
be utilized as distributed energy resources for energy manage-
ment. Moreover, it would also be interesting to investigate the
effects of non-ideal consumer behavior on an EV charging
management framework that incorporates renewable energy
sources.
REFERENCES
[1] D. Block, J. Harrison, and P. Brooker, “Electric vehicle sales for 2014
and future projections,” Florida Solar Energy Center, Tech. Rep., March
2015, Available at: http://www.fsec.ucf.edu.
[2] D. Wu, D. C. Aliprantis, and L. Ying, “Load scheduling and dispatch
for aggregators of plug-in electric vehicles,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid,
vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 368–376, March 2012.
[3] Z. Hu, K. Zhan, H. Zhang, and Y. Song, “Pricing mechanisms design
for guiding electric vehicle charging to fill load valley,” Applied Energy,
vol. 178, pp. 155 – 163, 2016.
[4] T. Franke and J. F. Krems, “Understanding charging behaviour of electric
vehicle users,” Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and
Behaviour, vol. 21, pp. 75–89, 2013.
[5] Y. Wang, W. Saad, N. B. Mandayam, and H. V. Poor, “Load shifting in
the smart grid: To participate or not?” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. PP,
no. 99, pp. 1–11, 2015.
[6] C. P. Mediwaththe and D. B. Smith, “Game-theoretic demand-side
management robust to non-ideal consumer behavior in smart grid,” in
Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. on Ind. Electron. (ISIE), June 2016, pp. 1–6,
Available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/1605.02402.
[7] Z. M. Shen and X. Su, “Customer behavior modeling in revenue
management and auctions: A review and new research opportunities,”
Production and operations management, vol. 16, no. 6, pp. 713–728,
2007.
[8] G. W. Harrison and E. Rutstrom, “Expected utility theory and prospect
theory: One wedding and a decent funeral,” Experimental Economics,
vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 133–158, June 2009.
[9] A. Chrysopoulos, C. Diou, A. L. Symeonidis, and P. A. Mitkas,
“Agent-based small-scale energy consumer models for energy portfolio
management,” in Proc. IEEE/WIC/ACM Int. Conf. on Web Intelligence
(WI) and Intelligent Agent Technologies (IAT), vol. 2, Nov 2013, pp.
94–101.
[10] Z. M. Fadlullah, D. M. Quan, N. Kato, and I. Stojmenovic, “Gtes: An
optimized game-theoretic demand-side management scheme for smart
grid,” IEEE Syst. J., vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 588–597, June 2014.
[11] R. Deng, Z. Yang, J. Chen, N. R. Asr, and M. Y. Chow, “Residential
energy consumption scheduling: A coupled-constraint game approach,”
IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 1340–1350, May 2014.
[12] H. M. Soliman and A. Leon-Garcia, “Game-theoretic demand-side
management with storage devices for the future smart grid,” IEEE Trans.
Smart Grid, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 1475–1485, May 2014.
[13] L. Song, Y. Xiao, and M. van der Schaar, “Demand side management
in smart grids using a repeated game framework,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas
Commun., vol. 32, no. 7, pp. 1412–1424, July 2014.
[14] W. Su and A. Q. Huang, “A game theoretic framework for a next-
generation retail electricity market with high penetration of distributed
residential electricity suppliers,” Applied Energy, vol. 119, pp. 341 –
350, 2014.
[15] A. H. Mohsenian-Rad, V. W. S. Wong, J. Jatskevich, R. Schober,
and A. Leon-Garcia, “Autonomous demand-side management based
on game-theoretic energy consumption scheduling for the future smart
grid,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 320–331, Dec 2010.
[16] M. Yu and S. H. Hong, “Supply-demand balancing for power manage-
ment in smart grid: A Stackelberg game approach,” Applied Energy, vol.
164, pp. 702 – 710, 2016.
[17] C. P. Mediwaththe, E. R. Stephens, D. B. Smith, and A. Mahanti, “A
dynamic game for electricity load management in neighborhood area
networks,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 1329–1336, May
2016.
[18] C. Mediwaththe, E. Stephens, D. Smith, and A. Mahanti, “Competitive
energy trading framework for demand-side management in neighbor-
hood area networks,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1–1,
2017.
[19] C. Dextreit and I. V. Kolmanovsky, “Game theory controller for hybrid
electric vehicles,” IEEE Trans. Control Syst. Technol., vol. 22, no. 2, pp.
652–663, March 2014.
[20] W. Lee, L. Xiang, R. Schober, and V. W. S. Wong, “Electric vehicle
charging stations with renewable power generators: A game theoretical
analysis,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 608–617, March
2015.
[21] S. Bahrami and M. Parniani, “Game theoretic based charging strategy
for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 5,
no. 5, pp. 2368–2375, Sept 2014.
[22] F. Malandrino, C. Casetti, and C. F. Chiasserini, “A holistic view of ITS-
enhanced charging markets,” IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst., vol. 16,
no. 4, pp. 1736–1745, Aug 2015.
[23] L. Zhang and Y. Li, “A game-theoretic approach to optimal scheduling of
parking-lot electric vehicle charging,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 65,
no. 6, pp. 4068–4078, June 2016.
Accepted to appear in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
[24] W. Tushar, W. Saad, H. V. Poor, and D. B. Smith, “Economics of electric
vehicle charging: A game theoretic approach,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid,
vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 1767–1778, Dec 2012.
[25] D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision
under risk,” Econometrica, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 263–292, Mar. 1979.
[26] A. H. Sanstad and R. B. Howarth, “Consumer rationality and energy
efficiency,” in Proc. American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy
(ACEEE), 1994, pp. 1–175.
[27] T. Li and N. B. Mandayam, “Prospects in a wireless random access
game,” in Proc. 46th Annu. Conf. Inf. Sci. and Syst. (CISS), March
2012, pp. 1–6.
[28] ——, “When users interfere with protocols: Prospect theory in wireless
networks using random access and data pricing as an example,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 1888–1907, April 2014.
[29] W. Saad, A. L. Glass, N. B. Mandayam, and H. V. Poor, “Toward a
consumer-centric grid: A behavioral perspective,” Proceedings of the
IEEE, vol. 104, no. 4, pp. 865–882, April 2016.
[30] Y. Wang, W. Saad, N. Mandayam, and H. Poor, “Integrating energy
storage into the smart grid: A prospect theoretic approach,” in Proc.
IEEE Int. Conf. on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP),
May 2014, pp. 7779–7783.
[31] Y. Wang and W. Saad, “On the role of utility framing in smart grid
energy storage management,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on Commun.
Workshop (ICCW), June 2015, pp. 1946–1951.
[32] P. Richardson, D. Flynn, and A. Keane, “Optimal charging of electric
vehicles in low-voltage distribution systems,” IEEE Trans. Power Sys-
tems, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 268–279, Feb 2012.
[33] K. Clement-Nyns, E. Haesen, and J. Driesen, “The impact of charging
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles on a residential distribution grid,” IEEE
Trans. Power Systems, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 371–380, Feb 2010.
[34] F. Li, “Continuous locational marginal pricing (clmp),” IEEE Trans.
Power Systems, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 1638–1646, Nov 2007.
[35] Z. Zhu, S. Lambotharan, W. H. Chin, and Z. Fan, “A game theoretic
optimization framework for home demand management incorporating
local energy resources,” IEEE Trans. Industrial Informatics, vol. 11,
no. 2, pp. 353–362, April 2015.
[36] L. Jiang and S. Low, “Multi-period optimal energy procurement and
demand response in smart grid with uncertain supply,” in Proc. IEEE
Conf. on Decision and Control and European Control Conference (CDC-
ECC), Dec 2011, pp. 4348–4353.
[37] L. Brown and Y. Shoham, Essentials of game theory, 1st ed. Morgan
and Claypool, 2008, pp. 10–48.
[38] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory, 11th ed. MIT Press, 1991,
pp. 94–110.
[39] J. Rosen, “Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for concave
N-person games,” Econometrica, vol. 33, pp. 347–351, 1965.
[40] W. Neilson and J. Stowe, “A further examination of cumulative prospect
theory parameterizations,” The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,, vol. 24,
no. 1, pp. 31–46, Jan. 2002.
[41] D. Prelec, “The probability weighting function,” Econometrica, vol. 66,
no. 3, pp. 497–527, May 1998.
[42] J. Flesch and A. Predtetchinski, “On refinements of subgame perfect
-equilibrium,” International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 45, pp. 523–
542, 2015.
[43] M. Yilmaz and P. T. Krein, “Review of battery charger topologies,
charging power levels, and infrastructure for plug-in electric and hybrid
vehicles,” IEEE Trans. Power Electronics, vol. 28, no. 5, pp. 2151–2169,
May 2013.
[44] E. Forward, K. Giltman, and D. Roberts, “An assessment of level 1 and
level 2 electric vehicle charging efficiency,” Vermont Energy Investment
Corporation, Tech. Rep., March 2013, Available at: https://www.veic.
org/docs/Transportation/20130320-EVT-NRA-Final-Report.pdf.
[45] B. Jones, N. Wilmot, and A. Lark, “Study on the impact of photovoltaic
(PV) generation on peak demand,” Western Power, Australia, Tech. Rep.,
April 2012, Available at: http://www.westernpower.com.au.
[46] Origin, “NSW residential energy price fact sheet (effective 1
april 2016),” 2016, Available at: https://www.originenergy.com.au/
content/dam/origin/residential/docs/energy-price-fact-sheets/nsw/NSW_
Electricity_Residential_AusGrid_Origin%20Supply.PDF.
PLACE
PHOTO
HERE
Chathurika P. Mediwaththe (S’12) received the
B.Sc. degree (Hons.) in electrical and electronic
engineering from the University of Peradeniya, Sri
Lanka. She completed the PhD degree in electrical
engineering at the University of New South Wales,
Sydney, NSW, Australia in 2017. From 2013-2017,
she was a research student with Data61-CSIRO
(previously NICTA), Sydney, NSW, Australia. She is
currently a research fellow at the Australian National
University, Canberra, ACT, Australia. Her current
research interests include electricity demand-side
management, smart grids, decision making (game theory and optimization)
for resource allocation in distributed networks, and machine learning.
PLACE
PHOTO
HERE
David B. Smith (S’01 - M’04) received the B.E.
degree in electrical engineering from the University
of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia, in
1997, and the M.E. (research) and Ph.D. degrees in
telecommunications engineering from the University
of Technology, Sydney, Ultimo, NSW, Australia, in
2001 and 2004, respectively.
Since 2004, he was with National Information
and Communications Technology Australia (NICTA,
incorporated into Data61 of CSIRO in 2016), and
the Australian National University (ANU), Canberra,
ACT, Australia, where he is currently a Senior Research Scientist with
Data61 CSIRO, and an Adjunct Fellow with ANU. He has a variety of
industry experience in electrical and telecommunications engineering. His
current research interests include wireless body area networks, game theory
for distributed networks, mesh networks, disaster tolerant networks, radio
propagation, 5G networks, antenna design, distributed optimization for smart
grid and privacy for networks. He has published over 100 technical refereed
papers. He has made various contributions to IEEE standardisation activity.
He has served (or is serving) on the technical program committees of
several leading international conferences in the fields of communications and
networks. Dr. Smith was the recipient of four conference Best Paper Awards.
